ISSN:2977-814X

ISSUE DOI: https://doi.org/10.51596/sijocp.v1i1 Volume 1 Issue 1

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The “Piano Casa”: Comparative Analysis and Evolution of an Italian Response Tool to the 2008 Economic Crisis

Andrea Ghirardi, PhD candidate, University of Brescia, Italy Barbara Badiani, Associate Professor, University of Brescia, Italy Ahmed Chebab, Postgraduate, University of Brescia, Italy

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Article History:

Received July 4, 2021

Accepted July 10, 2021

Published Online July 22, 2021


https://doi.org/10.51596/sijocp.v1i1.16


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Abstract

To encourage the recovery of the construction sector after the 2008 economic crisis, the Italian government has introduced different tools, among which stands out the “Piano casa” (literally translatable as House Plan).

The “Piano Casa” is a regulatory tool to incentivise the redevelopment of buildings applicable to different types of buildings and use classifications. It provides volumetric bonuses and discounts on charges for the extension or demolition and reconstruction of buildings. The Plan was implemented starting from a State-Regions agreement in 2009 in which the criteria and minimum bonuses indexes were defined. Subsequently, each region had to issue a specific law that could be calibrated according to the peculiarities of the territory.

The paper introduces the working principles of the tool and compares the laws of five chosen regions of north-central Italy (Emilia-Romagna et al.), defining how the State-Regions agreement has been declined in each case study. It also followed the evolution of the selected regional laws over time, highlighting the changes in the objectives and those relating to the bonuses granted. The five regions have been chosen because representatives of the different ways of application and outcomes.

One of the most important issues that were addressed during the study was the acceptance of the tool by the actors. In general, the Plan was immediately opposed by planners, municipalities and sometimes even by the same regions that had to issue the laws. In case the economic success achieved was considered minimal by the regional government, the Plan was abandoned in a short time. When the “Piano Casa” was judged positively, the regional government converted it from an emergency tool to a structural one. Moreover, some local authorities feared the risk of reducing their control on urban development, giving too much freedom to the market.

Keywords: crisis, recovery, politics, urban transformation, volumetric bonuses


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  1. Introduction

    The paper analyses the “Piano Casa” (from this point, literally translated as House Plan) proposed by the Italian government in 2009. The House Plan is a measure that disciplines a series of tools to facilitate interventions on the building heritage and derogate from local urban plans. The House Plan aims to stimulate investments by families and businesses in the construction and

    real estate sectors affected by the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Furthermore, the House Plan does not provide for tax incentives or public investments but the granting of volumetric bonuses applied to the redevelopment of the building stock (Lungarella, 2015).

    Immediately after the financial crisis that hit real estate in 2009, the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 caused a slowdown in economic growth in all sectors, further reducing investment opportunities (Pinzani, 2017). According to some estimates by ANCE (National Association of Builders), in Italy, in 2008-2015, the construction sector lost 34.8% of investments. New housing in the same period also fell by 66.5% (ANCE, 2015). The only segment that has held, albeit with a slowdown in growth, is that of the redevelopment of residential properties (ANCE, 2015). Consequently, it is precisely on this segment that the House Plan mainly acts.

    The House Plan was conceived at a national level. However, the implementation took place through the issuance of regional laws, according to the principle of concurring legislation between the State and the Regions in matters of urban planning, as provided for by the Italian Constitution. Chapter 2 will describe the setting of the House Plan, the stages of implementation, and its acceptance by various subjects, including experts, local administrators, sector associations, and citizens.

    The regional laws that implement the House Plan differ from region to region, supporting the strategies of local administrations, and have also had very different results. Moreover, in many regions, the House Plan has remained active well beyond the duration provided by the National Government: in 15 cases (out of 21 regions and autonomous provinces present in Italy), it was still active in 2021, and in 7 cases, it was integrated into the regional planning legislation governing urban transformations. The comparison between the regional laws implementing the House Plan allows us to consider the effectiveness of incentive tools based on volumetric bonuses, particularly the relationship with planning objectives.

    In Chapter 3, five case studies are explored, which, according to the authors, are useful for highlighting different ways of disciplining and applying the House Plan. The case studies are made up of the regions: Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Lombardy, Sardinia, and Veneto.

    Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna are located in Northern Italy, in an area strongly polarised by the presence of Milan and crossed by the infrastructural corridors of the Mediterranean, from Spain to Russia, and the Scandinavian axis, from Sicily to the Baltic Sea. The urban system is characterised by medium-sized cities located in the Po Valley area, along the east-west axis, with a widespread production component and congested tourist areas. In Lazio, in Central Italy, there is Rome and other medium-sized cities. Sardinia, one of the two main Italian islands, is characterised by an urban system strongly conditioned by the tourism sector and by a system of medium-sized urban centres.

    In 2009, when the House Plan was conceived, incentive tools based on volumetric bonuses were already provided in some cases. For example, in the case of Lombardy, the definition of criteria for applying volumetric bonuses was delegated to the local urban plan. Usually, these were applied in specific sectors in which it was intended to support the implementation of an urban transformation or the application of building techniques with established performances (such as those relating to energy efficiency).

  2. The National Policy

    In the first national elaboration of 2009, the House Plan provided the possibility of using the volumetric bonuses in a generalised way throughout the municipal area for expansion interventions or the demolition and reconstruction of existing buildings in derogation from the provisions of local urban plans. Moreover, the incentive is allowed if the interventions are carried out simultaneously with the improvement of the energy-saving performance of the building or the use of green building techniques. Furthermore, the interventions must be carried out mainly on residential construction, but not only.

    A draft of the law is shared with the President of the Conference of Regions1 and with ANCI (National Association of Italian Municipalities), and a discussion is initiated with the main stakeholders. The idea of the National Government was immediately challenged by environmental associations,

    urban planners such as Francesco Indovina, Bernardo Secchi, and Campos Venuti, and by most of the regional governments and municipalities. In summary, the plan is considered the result of an urban deregulation policy that has led to an intense waterproofing of the territory, a worsening of the architectural quality and enrichment of speculators (Chiorino, 2009; Indovina et al., 2009). Conversely, the professional associations and the builders are in favour, as they evidently see excellent profit opportunities (Chiorino, 2009; Lungarella, 2015).

    The opposition of the regions is a problem for the National Government, which has always had great faith in this tool2. In fact, according to the Italian Constitution, the national government can only enact laws of principle on urban planning. In other cases, an agreement between the State and the Regions called a State-Regions agreement, is required. For this reason, the State starts a debate with the regions aimed at defining an agreement based on which the regions could have declined the requirements of the House Plan in the territory of competence (Lungarella, 2015). Consequently, on 1 April 2009, it was signed by the State-Regions Conference. The agreement, which, among other things, excludes properties in violation of building regulations from the application of the bonuses, specifies the minimum percentages of volumetric increase:

    The Regions are given the task of defining the areas of intervention, with rules that must ensure the protection of cultural heritage and areas of environmental and landscape value, and of applying the plan for a minimum duration of 18 months, which can be extended.

    Even after the State-Regions agreement, urban planners such as Pier Luigi Cervellati and ANCI continued to reiterate their negative position [1]. However, the arguments used are not always convincing. For example, the risk of an increase in soil sealing, which is often referred to, should at least have been compared with what was being produced with the new urbanisations on agricultural land. In fact, the sticking point appears to be the loss of public control over private initiatives at the heart of the city’s planning processes (Indovina et al., 2009). There have been cases in which municipal administrators have changed their opinion on the House Plan, from negative to possible, if not positive, when it was made clear that it was their responsibility to decide on which areas to apply the volumetric bonuses [1].

    In the first 18 months of the application of the House Plan, the adhesion of private owners was limited (Lungarella, 2015). In 2011, the Government proposed the House Plan with Law 106/2011, adjusting the limitations: 20% of volume expansion is granted for any type of intervention on residential buildings, and the possibility of increasing volume by 10% is introduced for buildings with different uses. Furthermore, in the event of inertia of the regions, which should have promptly updated their House Plan, these volumetric bonuses could have been applied with a simple decision of the local administrations. Moreover, with law 106/2011, the National Government aims to relaunch the House Plan as an instrument of urban regeneration. Alongside the economic objectives borrowed from the 2009 version, the Government emphasises objectives such as redeveloping degraded urban areas and recovering brownfields. Nevertheless, using environmental protection arguments is a rhetorical strategy used to convince a wider audience of the effectiveness of the House Plan.

    Some changes can be observed in the results of the application. Although, as will be shown in Chapter 3, the effects on the construction sector have been very uneven throughout the country, in some regions, the interventions related to the House Plan, especially those of expansion, have become a driving force in the construction sector, while in the other regions, the tool remains almost unused. In 2015, the sector is still in crisis, as highlighted in Chapter 1. However, some analysts (Lungarella, 2017) point out that the application of the incentives of the House Plan can be considered positive. The data on the produced surfaces confirm the damping effect on the fall in investments in residential real estate.

  3. Regional Laws: Strategies and Effects

    In the five case studies analysed, the regional governments had different approaches to the House Plan and chose a different quality, respect, and duration of application. In summary, the five approaches identified are:

    The regional laws implementing the House Plan from 2009 to 2021, which were compared, are listed in Table 1.

    Table 1. List of the main laws by which the House Plan was implemented in the chosen regions.


    Emilia-Romagna

    LR 6 luglio 2009, n. 6

    Sardinia

    LR 14 luglio 2009, n. 20

    LR 21 novembre 2011, n. 21

    LR 23 aprile 2015, n. 8

    LR 03 luglio 2017, n. 11

    LR 18 gennaio 2021, n.1

    Lazio

    LR 11 agosto 2009, n.21

    LR 13 agosto 2011, n. 10

    LR 10 novembre 2014, n. 10

    LR 18 luglio 2017, n. 7

    Veneto

    LR 08 luglio 2009, n. 14

    LR 08 luglio 2011, n. 13

    LR 29 novembre 2013, n. 32

    LR 04 aprile 2019, n. 14

    Lombardy

    LR 16 luglio 2009, n. 13

    LR 13 marzo 2012, n. 4



    The comparison between the different formulations of the regional House Plans was conducted with respect to the bonuses granted, the areas of application, the positions of public actors, and the outcomes, also paying attention to the approval process. The comparison was deepened using the minutes of the Regional Council, the regional information documents, and articles on the subject available online in periodicals or association websites.

    An evaluation of the results of the application of the House Plan in the case studies was conducted through the processing of ISTAT data on building permits from 2006 to 2019 [2]. Since 2006, throughout Italy, there has been a sharp decrease in building permits, except for permits issued for residential extensions, as shown in Figure 1.


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    Figure 1. Index of residential permits for extensions issued in the five case studies from 2006 to 2019.

    Index number 2006=100 (processing of ISTAT data).

    Before the entry into force of the House Plan in 2009, in Lazio and Sardinia, the number of building permits for expansion decreased less rapidly than in the other case studies. In Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, from 2006 to 2019, building permits for expansion continue to fall but tend to stabilise. Moreover, in the case of Emilia-Romagna, despite the poor application of the tool, the data shows a change in trend in 2011. In the case of Veneto, Lazio and Sardinia, the evolution of pace is more evident. It takes place in different periods: in Veneto since 2009, Sardinia since 2011 and in Lazio since 2012. Furthermore, in Lazio’s case, there was a positive peak in 2017, followed

    by a rapid decrease.

    1. Emilia-Romagna

      In 2009, the President of the region recognised the opportunity of having a tool that could have positive countercyclical effects if green building had been encouraged, applying it primarily to public buildings and energy saving. However, his position on the current House Plan was one of open opposition: he considered it too oriented to speculative interests [3] (Delpiano & Malossi, 2009). Consequently, the Emilia-Romagna Region has prepared a single House Plan, no longer extended, without departing from the contents of the State-Regions agreement. Moreover, scepticism towards the House Plan and the tendency to limit its areas of application, especially the most sensitive ones, has been quite widespread and shared by some municipalities and provinces (Delpiano & Elettra, 2009). The data on implementation reflect the scepticism of politicians: in the 18 months of validity of the Plan, just over one hundred applications were submitted [4], and, in the study period analysed, the permits for expansion consistently decreased (Figure 1). However, in 2011, there was a slight recovery. After 2011, the decrease is less rapid than the previous loss, following a trend that can be seen more markedly in the other regions analysed. This may be indicative of a damping effect unrelated to the House Plan.

    2. Lombardy

      The Lombardy Government issued the first House Plan in 2009. Compared to the provisions of the State-Regions agreement, Lombardy chooses to expand the possibilities of applying the bonuses by raising the maximum size of the buildings that can access the bonuses from 1,000 to 1,200 square meters. From the minutes of the Regional Council [5], contrasting positions emerge: on the one hand, there are attempts to limit the areas of application, to preserve the most sensitive areas, such as park areas and agricultural areas, and on the other hand there are those who argue that “if we had a logic much closer to that of environmentalists than to that of real estate operators”, the potential of the instrument would have been significantly reduced. The scarce utilisation of the House Plan seems to justify this last position: after 18 months, only 350 applications were submitted. In the same period, 23,000 were presented in Veneto.

      However, the Lombardy region re-proposes the House Plan in 2012, focusing on environmental protection purposes, as required by Law 106/2011. In fact, the most critical positions soften [5], even if the modalities of action of the House Plan remain unchanged. Indeed, small increases in the bonus percentages and an expansion of the intended uses for which they can be granted are provided.

      Even with this formulation, the Lombardy House Plan is not very successful: the downward trend in the index of building permits does not change significantly (Figure 1) and continues to decrease until 2019. Most of the Regional Government is convinced that the exclusion by the municipalities of the most attractive areas for investment, especially those of landscape value, would be the basis of the poor results [5]. Therefore, the Region, unable to remove this limitation, prefers not to repeat the House Plan.

    3. Lazio

      In 2009, most of the Lazio Government expressed its negative opinion on the proposal for the national House Plan. However, as the State-Regions agreement requires, the Regional Government approves a first House Plan with some limitations in applying the incentive tool. In fact, the bonuses are not applied if the extension involves raising the building. In the event of demolition and reconstruction, it can only be applied in some areas. Consequently, between 2009 and 2011, the index of building permits continued to decline (Figure 1).

      The change of political direction of the Regional Government after the elections of 2010 led to the re-proposing of the House Plan in 2011, with some changes to encourage its application. In fact, the elevations are allowed, it is possible to increase volumes even in landscape protection areas, and the volumetric bonuses are increased by 10%. However, as mentioned, applying the bonuses in landscape protection areas is a choice in contrast with what is indicated in the State-Regions agreement. On this point, the National Government contest the regional law. Nevertheless, the

      Regional Government only adapted after the 2014 elections, which brought back to the majority the political forces hostile to the House Plan in 2009. The new government relaunches the House Plan in the least restrictive form of 2011, excluding only the application in landscape protection areas, to fall within the indications of the State-Regions agreement [6].

      The effect of these permissive choices can be seen, especially in the delicate skyline of Rome, where buildings from the early twentieth century, not protected but very interesting, have also been touched. Furthermore, in 2017, there was a peak in permits even higher than that recorded during the real estate boom of 2006 (Figure 1).

      Following these episodes, committees of citizens, associations and exponents of the cultural world have begun to move against the House Plan [6]. Therefore, the Regional Government decided to stop these operations and abandon the House Plan in its original conception, granting a period of delay regarding the proceedings already started. With the LR 18 July 2017, n. 7 the Regional Government opts for a law for urban regeneration. It establishes that the volumetric bonuses of the House Plan are applicable only through specific municipal ordinances, in which the territorial areas of application are specified, strengthening the control role of the municipal administrations. Consequently, since 2018, the number of building permits has been greatly reduced, almost reaching the level of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna (Figure 1).

    4. Sardinia

      The first version of the House Plan, approved by Sardinia Region in 2009, quite faithfully follows the volumetric bonuses indicated by the National Government. The permitted uses are residential, tourist accommodation, production, and services related to the residence. Conversely, restricted buildings, buildings in the historic centres and, for uses other than agricultural, those in extra- urban areas are excluded. The regulation remains unchanged, even in the subsequent three versions of the law, issued in 2011, 2015, and 2017.

      According to a 2012 regional report [7], the House Plan is presented as a highly effective tool for economic revitalisation in the construction sector, especially for residential construction (90% of the applications submitted). Indeed, after 2010, the number of expansion permits increased (Figure 1). Indeed, the tool’s success is to convince the Regional Government to propose a new version in 2021 to counter the effects of the pandemic crisis. From the minutes of the meetings of the Regional Council [8], a continuity emerges in the position of most of the Regional Government. Moreover, in this latest version, there is an increase in the volumetric bonuses granted, from 20- 30% to 35-40%, and concessions that broaden the application areas more than in the other case studies.

      In a region characterised by a real estate market mainly supported by the tourism sector, attracted especially by the landscape value of the coasts, which are, however, very fragile from the point of view of environmental risk, the propensity to support the reasons of the economy, rather than those of the environmental protection, is striking. However, in the minutes [8], we read: “Environmental protection must not be a brake on the future of the Sardinian economy”.

      In particular, the latest law extends the application to areas of landscape protection, properties in violation of building codes (frequent in these areas), and buildings located in historic centres. Furthermore, the decision-making margin of the municipalities in defining the applicability of the bonuses is reduced. Therefore, with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers on 19 March 2021, the National Government contested the law in almost all its articles (27 out of 31). The State has accepted the opponents’ position in the regional council, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, the National Civil Protection, and the environmental associations who, with a petition, have solicited an appeal [8] [9]. The procedure is still in progress at the date of writing.

    5. Veneto

      The government of the Veneto region is the most convinced of the economic potential offered by the House Plan. Already in March 2009, the Veneto Government had anticipated the national government approving a law that allowed expansions in derogation of urban planning instruments

      up to a limit of 20%, without the obligation of energy requalification. Furthermore, after the State- Regions agreement, the Veneto Region increased the volumetric bonuses without introducing specific limitations that were not provided for in the agreement. Moreover, the House Plan is also welcomed by the municipalities: only some cities place restrictions on interventions, mainly in historic centres and in extra-urban areas, and in several cases, it is allowed to add bonuses to the residual building potential of the municipal plans [10]. With subsequent laws, the Region further increases volumetric bonuses. Consequently, local administrations, seeing the risk of an increase in pressure on urban services, which could be put in distress, do not allow the application of the bonuses in the absence of an adaptation of the underground utilities. Therefore, the 2013 law tries to deny municipalities the possibility of limiting the application of the House Plan, but this change will be removed following an appeal by the national government.

      The application of the House Plan in Veneto is broad: in the regional information brochures on the House Plan [11], published between 2013 and 2015, 69,762 permits issued in 2013 are reported (97% of which are for extensions). Moreover, up to 2018, more than 100.000 permits have been issued (Freschi & Boldo, 2020). Furthermore, the graph in Figure 1 shows a stable trend in the expansion permits up to 2019.

      The Regional Councillor for the Territory, in a 2014 brochure [11], expressed an apparent position on the role of urban planning in relaunching the economy: planning is a means by which to grasp the demands of the market and ensure well-being. This statement confirms the more traditionally rhetorical positions on the economic and, incidentally, social purposes of public action through territorial governance. Furthermore, according to the Veneto Government, urban planning must ensure the financial advantage of real estate interventions, even when pursuing environmental protection objectives. Thus, in the regional law 6 June 2017, n. 14, the incentive tool is applied by linking it to a regional strategy of urban reuse and containment of land consumption (Freschi & Boldo, 2020). In this law, the maximum volumetric bonuses can be further increased up to 60-100%, using “naturalisation credits” or rather through the demolition of incongruous artefacts identified by the municipalities and natural restoration of the soil.

  4. Conclusion

The paper analysed the House Plan, a volumetric incentive tool proposed by the Italian Government in 2009 to support the recovery of the real estate sector after the 2008 economic crisis and implemented by means of regional laws. To do this, five case studies were considered, representative of a different approach of regional governments towards the House Plan. From the comparison of the case studies, it emerged that:

In conclusion, it can be argued that incentive tools of this type can be a valid economic aid in the years immediately following a crisis in real estate. Still, they are not able to revive the sector so that it can sustain itself autonomously once the effects of the tool are exhausted. Furthermore, their use entails high risks for urban quality and landscape protection, as they are the more successful (in economic terms), the more they allow for transformations guided mainly by the logic of market speculation. Moreover, the latter finding makes it very difficult to believe that an incentive tool of this type can be applied effectively to implement environmental sustainability policies.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Endnotes

  1. The Conference of Regions and Autonomous Provinces is the official seat of interregional institutional dialogue. Here, the documents are prepared, presented and illustrated to the Government in the meetings of the State-Regions Conference and the Unified Conference [12].

  2. The government estimates the positive effects on the economy at 75-150 billion euros (Lungarella, 2015)

  3. This paper has been presented at the SPACE International Conference 2021 on City Planning and Urban Design.

References

ANCE - National Association of Builders. (2015). Osservatorio congiunturale sull’industria delle costruzioni. EDILSTAMPA.

Chiorino, C. (2009, April). Piano Casa un mese in altalena: si fa, non si fa, ma alla fine si fa. Chi è pro e chi contro. Il giornale dell’architettura(72), p. 3.

Delpiano, A., & Elettra, M. (2009). La pianificazione sovracomunale. Le Istituzioni del Federalismo, 35-60.

Freschi, R., & Boldo, A. (2020). Dieci anni di politiche per la domanda: note sul Piano Casa del Veneto. Archivio di studi urbani e regionali, 127(1), 23-47.

Indovina, F., et.all. (2009, 06 11). Critiche di tre urbanisti al “piano casa” di Berlusconi. Tratto da eddyburg.it.

Lungarella, R. (2015). L’efficacia dei premi edificatori nei Piani casa regionali. Una valutazione d’insieme. Istituzioni del Federalismo, 2015(3), 793-828.

Lungarella, R. (2017). Gli effetti controversi dei Piani Casa. Urbanistica Informazioni, 272, 45-47. Pinzani, C. (2017). Storia della crisi finanziaria: 2007-...? Roma: Castelvecchi.

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Corresponding Author: Andrea Ghirardi, PhD candidate, University of Brescia, a.ghirardi007@unibs.it